The Shifting Vocabulary of Antitrust--Legal Linguistics in a Period of Change by Bock, Betty
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 2
1985
The Shifting Vocabulary of Antitrust--Legal
Linguistics in a Period of Change
Betty Bock
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Betty Bock, The Shifting Vocabulary of Antitrust--Legal Linguistics in a Period of Change, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 326 (1985)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol36/iss2/6
Commentary
THE SHIFTING VOCABULARY
OF ANTITRUST-LEGAL
LINGUISTICS IN A PERIOD
OF CHANGE*
Betty Bock**
This Commentary represents a meditation on the relationship of modern antitrust
law to the language in which it is phrased The author illustrates that permissible and
impermissible competitive behavior is defined using concepts inherently difficult to
delimit Unlike in other areas of the law, the language of antitrust is made up of
concepts that are relative, bounded only by their implied opposite. For example the
law prohibits both too little competition through conspiracy and too much competition
through predation. The ambiguous boundaries of these abstractions allow dramatic
shifts in enforcement policy, as illustrated by the evolution of per se versus rule of
reason analysis in the merger, price fixing, and vertical restraints areas.
INTRODUCTION
ANTITRUST, encompassing policy, law, and the interpretation
of the functions and malfunctions of an enterprise system, is ex-
periencing a series of changes. The manifestations of change vary
with the actions and reactions of the complex institutions responsi-
ble for shaping the economy's competitive profile. Since the end of
World War II, shifts in antitrust have tended to reflect shifts in the
public's perception of the economy's health, which we now view
with more caution than during the 1950's and 1960's as we find
ourselves increasingly carrying out transactions in a global econ-
omy. Antitrust's evolution also reflects the increased awareness of
the constraints on competitive efficiency imposed by blindly struc-
tural per se rules. And so, since the early 1970's, the courts, and
since the early 1980's, the federal enforcement agencies, have begun
* The material prompting this Commentary was originally presented at a seminar held
at Case Western Reserve Law School on March 20, 1985.
** Consultant, Antitrust Research, The Conference Board, and Adjunct Professor of
Law, New York University School of Law. A.B., 1936, M.A., 1937, Ph.D., 1942, Bryn
Mawr College.
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to experiment with newly articulated standards based on efficiency
and defined in terms of cost effectiveness, opportunities for innova-
tion, and rule-of-reason flexibility with respect to competitive
conduct.
As might be expected of a complex national policy in a period of
changing concepts and facts, the shifts in antitrust have not been
monolithic. The three-ply system of enforcement-federal, state,
and private-has resulted in divergent formulations of the purposes
of antitrust, as well as divergent sources of financial support for an-
titrust cases. At the same time, multiple systems for interpreting
the meaning of the law and the validity of evidence have led to vary-
ing analyses of what antitrust is. We have, for example, the inter-
pretations of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
and of the Federal Trade Commission through speeches, formal
clearances, and the cases they have and have not brought. We also
have the interpretations of Congress, of the courts, and of private
legal and economic advisers and scholars.
It is not surprising, then, that the rich texture and complex pro-
cess of substantiation and transubstantiation of the corpus of anti-
trust now raise fundamental questions concerning the basis of
antitrust and its consequences as it evolves. We need, therefore, to
consider whether or not antitrust is simply a conventional law of
which violation is directly determinable. We also need to ask
whether antitrust represents an objective method of preserving or
modifying existing competitive institutions or whether it reflects,
with lags, ongoing technological and organizational change.
I believe that antitrust consists of a language system reflecting
enterprise change rather than a law controlling such change. As
such, antitrust can be viewed as a code of verbal communication
concerning the relationships of companies with competitors, suppli-
ers, and customers in ever-widening circles that map the transac-
tional matrices that, in turn, are reflected in, and are changed by,
the language of the law.
I. ANTITRUST AS A LANGUAGE
Some believe that man creates language to fit the world he per-
ceives. Others contend that language shapes man's perception of
his world, that he sees the world not in fixed categories, but in
whatever categories he needs at any given time to organize his per-
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ceptions of it.1 When verbal categories are too broad for appropri-
ate differentiation or too narrow to include more than a single item,
written language becomes merely print, and spoken language, noise.
Thus, antitrust law, necessarily expressed through language, can
represent a serious attempt to shape and order categories of corpo-
rate conduct. Or, on the other hand, it can represent a game played
with symbols with dual, and often contradictory, meanings.
Competition law seeks to translate what we want from inter-
enterprise economic systems into what we will get, but the law has
become entangled in the dualities of competition vocabulary. This
is primarily a problem rooted in fact and in the semantics pertaining
to fact. It is not, as is generally supposed, a problem with the poli-
tics of power, or in the see-saw between an "older" and "newer"
economics of antitrust. If there were even three or four clear, key
words in the vocabulary of antitrust we would have no such
problems. Instead, we have a plurality of words, concepts, criteria
and conclusions, which relate to a statute phrased in broad terms
and to court and enforcement agency decisions applying to specific,
and often unique, sets of facts.
How this noise has affected antitrust discourse is difficult to for-
mulate, since the advocacy process aggravates the problems associ-
ated with the duality of the concepts. Any reading of published
enforcement agency and court decisions reveals that day-to-day
meanings of "antitrust" are constantly being reshaped by the debate
format of the advocacy process, with opposing advocates each as-
serting that he is seeking to illumine the conditions for competition.
The resulting allegations and counter-allegations create a curiously-
patterned discordance, lacking consensus in economics, legal phi-
losophy, or awareness of the complex interrelationships between
justice and economic efficiency.
Antitrust's most fundamental unit of thought, the concept of
competition, lies at the core of the problem. The definition of com-
petition creates a paradox from which no logic compatible with the
concept can permanently extricate us. Competition benefits some
firms and hurts others; practices designed to increase competition
by one rival tend to reduce opportunity for competition by other
rivals.2 In fact, competition law is designed to prevent both too
I. See R. BURLING, MAN'S MANY VoicEs: LANGUAGE IN ITS CULTURAL CONTEXT
(1970); G. STEINER, AFTER BABEL, ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION (1975).
2. Even if a market grows and all sellers increase their sales, the more successful of a
set of rivals will, by definition, attain some sales that less successful rivals could otherwise
have attained.
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little competition (through express or implied conspiracy) and too
much competition (through express or implied coercion, exclusion,
or predation). It follows that every strong competitive move is one
toward both an increase in the initiator's and a reduction in a rival's
competitive potential. This duality intensifies the advocacy process
and permits broad shifts in enforcement policy as different facets of
both the vocabulary and the grammar in which the paradox can be
stated appear as solutions.
The language of antitrust rarely deals with this paradox as a
whole, but instead normally focuses on only a single facet in the
context of a specific case decision or agency guideline.3 Consider
the three linked antitrust concepts that are the most fundamental
and yield the most controversy: the concept of competition itself,
the concept of a market; and the concept of market power, as mea-
sured by market share and concentration ratios.
A. The Concept of "Competition"
The concept of competition is not a fixed one. In a classically-
modeled market with many small interchangeable competitors
making homogeneous products, competitive (and ultimately identi-
cal) prices based on identical costs arising out of identical systems
of procurement, production, and distribution are seen as parts of a
mechanism matching supply with demand in the short run, as well
as attracting new supply and demand (or reducing old supply and
demand) in the long run. Such pricing will, it is argued, create out-
puts appropriate to demand and will neither shut out, underreward,
nor overreward competitors.
In the world around us, however, we find companies of different
sizes and product mixes with differing costs, so that competition
tends to focus on niches within which the cost-price margins of each
seller can, he hopes, be maximized over time if demand expands as
costs and prices fall. In such a world, a seller who picks the wrong
niche, fails to control his costs, or sets prices that are too high or
too low will be forced out of business. The same will be true for a
seller who seeks to overcontrol or undercontrol his distribution
network.
3. Any reference to paradoxes in this Commentary acknowledges the seminal work of
Robert H. Bork. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH IT-
SELF (1978).
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B. The Concept of "'Markets"
Similarly, the concept of a market, which is central to and
formed by the concept of competition, is never so clear-cut as the
antitrust use of the term suggests. A market can be described as an
economic arena positioned in a product-geographic and time-and-
price space in which a "class" of commodities or services or some
combination of the two is bought and sold. But the prod-
ucts/services can assume different forms, be made in different ways
and at different costs, and serve different uses in the same or differ-
ent time periods. With this differentiation come shifts in the con-
tours of markets. Consider today's uses of telephone lines. . . and
pasta!
Moreover, as the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines demon-
strate, the boundaries of what may initially be thought of as a mar-
ket shift with the potential for entry or exit after a given price
change.' But, "entry" into and "exit" from a market are words
representing concepts that themselves have an array of meanings.
"Entry" can, for example, refer to an increase in the supply of an
item offered by either existing or new sellers, some of whom may
have already been selling other products or services and some of
whom may be starting new businesses. "Entry" can also refer to
the development of substitutes for the product, service or any of the
other dimensions of the original market. "Exit" can have mirror
image definitions, too.
C. The Concept of "Market Power"
Finally, the concept of market power used so ritualistically in
the literature as a measure of a company's, or a set of companies',
ability to distort competition is subject to even greater variations
both in method of measurement and in interpretation of what a
given measure signifies. The two most common measures are "mar-
ket shares" and "concentration." 5
4. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines - 1982 (June 14, 1982), reprinted in
2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) % 4500-4505; U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines -
1984 (June 14, 1984), reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4490-4495.
5. A market share represents the percentage of output or sales enjoyed by a particular
firm in a particular industry. Concentration may represent the combined market shares of a
few of the largest companies in a market. For example, the "4-firm ratio" measures the
largest four firms' aggregated market shares. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 56-57 (2d ed. 1980). In the automobile indus-
try, for example, the top four companies in 1972 accounted for 99% of the industry's ship-
ments and interplant transfers as defined by The Bureau of the Census, while in the bottled
and canned soft drink sector, the top four accounted for only 14% of shipments and inter-
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A market share figure normally used as a preliminary guide (in
rule of reason analysis) or as virtually the only guide (in a per se
analysis)6 to the market power of an individual company is neither
simple to derive nor stable over time, unless, of course, the "mar-
ket" has been transfixed like a butterfly on a pin. Because market
boundaries change with shifts in price, supply, demand, or other
aspects of a market, the market share figure will itself shift. There-
fore, the competitive meaning of the figure fluctuates with it.
While a "high" market share in a stable market can suggest a
degree of market power that violates the law if it has been achieved
or maintained in ways that are anticompetitive, such a figure can
also have a procompetitive ineaning. A high market share can, for
example, be a symptom of active competition when a market is new
or when it is old and dying. It can also be a symptom of active
competition in a mature market if a company is forging a niche by
finding a way to lower prices by lowering costs, or improving prod-
ucts or services, or both.
Meanwhile, a concentration index of the type normally used in
the same way as a market share figure as a guide to the combined
power of the major competitors in a market is nothing more than a
figure signifying a collection of market shares-for example, a first-
4 company concentration ratio or a Herfindahl Index.' Such figures
are often seen as magical numbers but, in fact, are simply aggregates
of market shares and suffer precisely the same ambiguities. In fact,
the uncertainty is magnified, because the aggregate ratios or indices
are made up of more variables than a single-firm market share
figure.
What we see, then, as "competition," as a "market," and as
"market power" depends on how we perceive a wide range of vari-
ables. "Competition" in markets, as well as high "market share" or
plant transfers. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS CONCENTRA-
TION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING (1975). On the other hand, concentration may be
measured by a profile of the relative market shares of all sellers in a market. For example, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index equals the sum of the squares of the shares of each company.
Thus, for a market inhabited by ten firms of equal size, the index would be 1000. See F.M.
SCHERER, at 58-59. The Justice Department has adopted the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
as a measure of market concentration in its Horizontal Merger Guidelines. See U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Merger Guidelines - 1984, reprinted in 2 TRAD REG. REP. at % 4493.01.
6. A "rule of reason" approach weighs the corresponding burdens and benefits of the
trade restraint in appraising its legal status. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). Conversely, a "per se" rule is designed to permit quick disposal
of the restraint issue by application of an inflexible rule. See, eg., United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
7. See supra note 5.
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"market power," or "dominance" and "concentration," are not
"things" in themselves, but rather concepts comprised of ambigu-
ous words designed to describe changing relationships in a changing
world.
II. WORDS MEAN WHAT I WANT THEM To MEAN
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scorn-
ful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less.' "I Lewis Carroll, author of Alice in Wonderland, knew very
well that we live in a world of factual complexity and linguistic am-
biguity, a world on which we impose verbal patterns which help us
see and think about what is going on around us. But the patterns
we select, whether we are conscious of it or not, are intended to
support our belief that we can influence human behavior by imput-
ing real and clear meanings to the words we use.
In the area of competition policy, for example, we tend to use
what might be called "pseudo-analytic" labels for events without
clear standards of how the labels relate to facts or to each other.
This tends to happen because we treat words referring to abstrac-
tions as if they applied to specific enumerable things, when, in fact,
our most fundamental abstractions imply both a concept and its
opposite, usually without a clearly determinable boundary between
the two. "Justice" is bounded by "injustice". . . "beauty," by "ug-
liness" . . . and "competition," by "failure of competition," and it
is unclear at what point one becomes the other. Indeed, without
such ambiguously dual attributes, it is impossible to understand the
concepts. Three simple examples from antitrust are illustrative, two
focusing primarily on what has come to be called a "structural"
standard and the third on what has come to be called a "conduct"
standard.
A. "Oligopoly"
An "oligopoly" market is one in which there are few sellers.'
But any determination of whether there are few sellers depends on
how we delimit the boundaries of the market. Even if we negotiate
that dificulty, new ones turn up as soon as we attempt to use the
oligopoly concept.
8. L. CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND
& THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 269 (New Am. ed. 1960).
9. See E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, A RE-ORI-
ENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE 8, 30-55 (6th ed. 1948).
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During the 1960's, for example, many economists believed that
an oligopoly was automatically anticompetitive because the major
companies operating in an oligopoly market would, whether con-
sciously or unconsciously, avoid independent competitive action.
They argued that each seller would fear that it would eventually
lose to its rivals whatever short-term gains it might realize from
individual active competition.10
In more recent years, other economists have challenged this be-
lief, suggesting that companies operating in a market where they
have few competitors are, in fact, initiators or survivors of competi-
tion who are producing an appropriate package at an appropriate
price. If this were not so, they would not be there. Under this for-
mulation, any rule which would proscribe fewness would support
weaker firms, while eroding the capability of stronger and more
competitive firms. Indeed, the widespread belief that high concen-
tration or fewness of companies in a market always leads to conspir-
acy or its equivalent in passive competition cannot always be
correct. Only if the interests of each of the "few" firms are the same
can one believe that mere paucity of numbers will be synonymous
with "conspiracy" and "market power." If the long-run goals, capi-
tal structures, products or product mixes, or costs of the companies
differ, it is difficult to see how they would find it in their self-interest
to charge the same prices for very long.
The dual character of any interpretation of "fewness" in a mar-
ket is inherent in the fact that the concept of competition has a
polarized structure. Moreover, more factors than can be easily iso-
lated and independently studied enter into the make-up of the
number of sellers competent to function at a given time in a given
10. See, ag., In re Ethyl, 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nor. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). The FTC held that DuPont, Ethyl,
PPG Industries, and Nalco Chemical Co. had engaged in unfair competition in selling their
antiknock gasoline compounds. These four defendants were the only producers in this mar-
ket. Each firm had independently and unilaterally adopted at different times somi or all of
three business practices: (1) a delivered price (including transportation costs); (2) extra ad-
vance notice given to customers of price increases beyond the 30 days provided by contract;
and (3) a "most favored nation" clause under which the seller agreed that no customer would
be charged a higher price than other customers. Although the FTC agreed that defendants'
adoption of these practices was noncollusive, it ruled that they collectively had the effect of
substantially lessening competition by removing some of the uncertainties concerning price
determination. Price parallelism, reasoned the FTC, would result. 101 F.T.C. at 428.
The Second Circuit reversed the FTC's holding, instead finding each of these three pricing
policies reasonable. The court noted that governmental limits on lead concentrates in gaso-
line had caused the lead additive market to become inelastic, and any price competition
would result in a zero sum game. 729 F.2d at 131. Needless to say, enthusiasm for price
competition was low.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
market. 1
B. "Monopolization"
A monopoly can be defined as a firm that can determine its own
prices and prevent entry of competitors. 12 A company can do this
only if it has a very large share of a market with boundaries it can
defend from entry. As in the case of an "oligopoly" market,
whether a monopolist exists depends on how we define the bounda-
ries of its market. Again, even if we get past that difficulty, new
ones turn up as soon as we attempt to use the monopolization
concept.
For example, monopoly pricing is perceived by many as the
greatest of a monopolist's sins, and every monopolist is thought to
be necessarily engaged in monopoly pricing. But why? From the
1940's through the 1960's, many economists believed that if a com-
pany had no, or only weak, competitors, it would by definition
charge a price well above its costs and, lacking competitors to un-
dercut such prices, would be able to amass monopoly profits. These
profits, in turn, could prevent entry of competitors if used to over-
finance advertising or to fund predatory (below-cost) pricing to pe-
nalize would-be competitors.
By the late 1960's, however, a different view of monopolization
began to emerge. Under this theory, a monopolist who charged too
high a price, or sold too inferior a product, would simply attract
competitors. If, therefore, a monopolist continued to exist, it must
be giving consumers the benefits of what would otherwise be com-
petition. A corollary to this second theory is that the longer the
time period in which such a monopolist sustains itself, absent gov-
ernment controls or other artificial barriers to entry, the more suc-
cessfully it is serving the public interest.
C. "Vertical Restraints"
As a third example, consider what are known as vertical re-
straints.'" If, for example, a manufacturer places resale require-
11. See Bock, The Limits of Words and Numbers: Be Careful When Wandering at the
Brink of a Precipice Without an Experienced Guide, in BUSINESS DISCLOSURE: GOVERN-
MENT'S NEED TO KNOW 264 (H. Goldschmid ed. 1979).
12. See F.M. SCHERER, supra note 5, at 11.
13. See U.S. Department of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines, [special supplement]
48 ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1199 (Jan. 24, 1985). See generally Note,
The Vertical Restraints Guidelines: Improvement or More Confusion?, 36 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 150 (1985).
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ments on his distributors, is he reducing or increasing his or their
competitive acumen? Many commentators felt in the past that any
restriction on an independent reseller was a restraint of trade and
automatically violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 4
Today, however, a strikingly different view is gaining accept-
ance. If a distributor has chosen its present supplier even though
other choices were available, the restraint cannot be anticompeti-
tive. Moreover, no supplier wants to reduce the combined sales of
his distributors; indeed, every supplier wants to have the most effec-
tive marketing program possible. Therefore, a supplier restricting
sales territories, determining the locations of distributors, or pre-
scribing the prices at which distributors will resell is simply at-
tempting to maximize both his and their returns and to prevent any
distributor from taking a free ride on the advertising and services
provided by other distributors.
III. LANGUAGE LEVELS
Manufacturers of computer software speak of high-level and
low-level languages. A high-level language requires little user
knowledge of how a computer works; he simply gives instructions
in normal sentence form. A low-level language, by contrast, re-
quires the user to have a more detailed understanding of how the
computer operates, since he must construct directions with a sen-
tence structure and a vocabulary tailored to the computer
hardware.
A high-level language allows greater ease in programming but
confines the user to the forms of communication built into the
grammar of the machine. Conversely, a low-level language requires
more direct intervention in machine operations but permits greater
flexibility in the range of instructions the machine can understand.
Thus, the higher the level, the more formal the machine language;
the lower the level, the more closely will the language be able to
describe and analyze complex and changing fact situations.
This distinction between computer language levels is analogous
to the distinction between per se (high-level) and rule of reason
(low-level) tests for competitive behavior.' Per se rules are more
stylized and putatively easier to use than rules of reason, while rules
of reason can be adapted to particularized and changing facts with
14. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (currently codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
15. See supra note 6.
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greater flexibility but are difficult to apply in complex cases. Exami-
nation of the Supreme Court's recent antitrust decisions reveals a
series of shifts between formalism and realism-between the relative
certainty but awkwardness of a high-level language and the relative
uncertainty but greater responsiveness to case facts of a less formal-
istic language. Examples in the merger and price-fixing area are
instructive.
Some mergers may substantially lessen competition, others may
fortify competition, and still others may lie between the extremes.
Until recently, however, no serious attempt was made to establish
criteria differentiating the three scenarios. Instead, the law focused
on mergers that the courts could find as violating Section 7 of the
Clayton Act as amended in 1950.16 This approach resulted in a line
of decisions that slowly but relentlessly adopted an increasingly
high-level language.
Thus, in Brown Shoe, 17 its first decision under the amended law,
the Court invalidated a merger that would have resulted in a market
share for the combined company as low as six percent in the na-
tional shoe market and as low as five percent in some retail shoe
markets. The Court did not, however, rely solely on market share
figures, but also referenced other factors that it considered in reach-
ing its decision. 8
By 1963, the Court was moving beyond Brown Shoe. In Phila-
delphia National Bank,19 it used market share and concentration
tests to evaluate the probability that the merger of two commercial
banks in Philadelphia might substantially lessen competition or
tend toward monopoly. The Court found that such a horizontal
merger, resulting in a combined share of approximately thirty-three
16. The Clayton Act Amendment of 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (currently codified at
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)) (amending the Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730).
17. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
18. The additional factors included the fact that in an industry as fragmented as shoe
retailing, the "control" of even a five percent market share in a given city might encourage
Brown's competitors to seek similar market shares to the point where it would be difficult to
dissolve combinations previously approved. Furthermore, in so fragmented an industry, the
fact that even a small share of a particular market is held by a large national chain can, said
the Court, adversely affect competition because the chain can insulate selected outlets from
the vagaries of competition and can so manipulate styles in footwear that independents be-
come unable to maintain competitive inventories. A third factor, in the Court's view, was the
fact that the merger created a large national chain integrated with a manufacturing operation
in such a way that Brown could sell through its outlets at prices below those of competing
independent retailers. Id. at 339-46. Note that such an increase in efficiency would, under
the 1984 merger guidelines, be occasion for approval rather than disapproval of a merger.
See supra note 4.
19. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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percent of the market, might substantially lessen competition, par-
ticularly when concentration in the two largest banks in the area
would have reached a level of forty-four percent.20 The Court
brushed aside the defense that customers would still have alterna-
tives to the merged company by stating that in every case short of
outright monopoly, a disgruntled customer has alternatives.21 It
also found irrelevant the justification that the merger would be of
social and economic benefit to the community, holding essentially
that the market share and concentration figures alone were suffi-
cient grounds for prohibiting the merger.22
Moving on through the 1960's, the enforcement agencies and
the courts began to take the market share and concentration stan-
dards of Brown Shoe and Philadelphia National Bank literally, in-
validating acquisitions where market shares or concentration ratios
were "too high" in a market affected by an acquisition. Little or no
attention was paid to other facts, such as whether it would be easy
for rivals to enter the market and erode an acquiring company's
market share if the company were to overprice or to take advantage
of customers in other ways. Moreover, little weight was given to
the relativity of market boundaries and, therefore, to the possibility
of shifts in market shares and concentration levels.2 3
In 1974, however, the Supreme Court tentatively began to re-
verse its course and to look at individual company and market cir-
cumstances. The Court found in General Dynamics24 that neither
past market shares nor past concentration ratios were relevant to a
prediction of the competitive consequences of a merger if the condi-
tions upon which the shares and ratios depended could be expected
to change in ways that would reduce these figures. In General Dy-
namics, Material Service Corporation and its successor, General
Dynamics Corporation, had acquired the stock of United Electric
Coal Companies. At the time of the acquisition, Material Service's
coal was produced from deep-shaft mines operated by it or its afili-
ate, Freeman Coal Mining Corporation. Both the acquiring and the
acquired company mined coal in Illinois and in a wider set of states
labeled the Eastern Interior Coal Province, with Freeman and
20. Id. at 364-65.
21. Id. at 367.
22. Id. at 371.
23. For an early example of this method of analysis, see Bock, The Relativity of Eco-
nomic Evidence in Merger Cases Emerging Decisions Force the Issue, 63 MICH. L. Ray.
1355-72 (1965).
24. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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United Electric together accounting for about twenty-two percent
of the coal mined in Illinois and eleven percent of that mined in the
Province .2  At the time of the acquisition, United Electric had a
long-term requirements contract for delivery of coal to a public util-
ity which would ultimately exhaust the company's coal reserves. It
followed, said the Court, that whatever the past level of the com-
bined market shares of the two companies and their competitive
effects might be, future adverse effects upon competition could not
be assumed, since none of United Electric's reserves would ever be
sold on the market.26 This conclusion by the Supreme Court repre-
sented acceptance of a language level lower than that used in any of
the Court's earlier decisions.
As the 1970's wore on into the 1980's, the Department of Justice
issued two sets of merger guidelines27 designed to update earlier
guidelines issued in 1968 2s-well before the 1974 General Dynamics
decision. Thus, in 1982, under Assistant Attorney General William
F. Baxter, and again in 1984, under Assistant Attorney General J.
Paul McGrath, merger guidelines were promulgated using what
could only be considered a lower-level language than was used in
the 1968 guidelines. New market share and concentration tests
were developed, with the primary decision of whether to go forward
with a merger investigation tied to what became known as the
"Herfindahl Index" of concentration.29 If this index combined with
a market share figure was below a stated level, the Department
would drop the case; if the figures were between two other levels, it
would investigate; and if they were above specified levels, it would
likely act. The Guidelines also provided additional factors to con-
sider in determining whether a current market share or concentra-
tion figure understated or overstated a company's future
competitive significance. One such factor would be a recent or on-
going change in market conditions; a second, the financial condition
of the merged firm or any other firm in the relevant market; a third
would be the factors that might affect the competitive importance of
foreign firms; and a fourth, the ability of fringe firms with excess
capacity to expand output quickly so as to easily reduce the likeli-
hood of collusion.
25. Id. at 496.
26. Id. at 486-504.
27. See supra note 4.
28. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines - 1968 (May 30, 1968), reprinted in
2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510 (May 30, 1968).
29. See supra note 5.
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This shift from a higher-toward a lower-level language by the
Department of Justice did not, however, seriously affect the lan-
guage level used in state or private merger cases. Congress, too, has
not been happy with what it sees as a regression to a "lower level"
mode of communication on enterprise matters properly dealt with
by the "higher level" modes of the 1960's.30
Another problem in language levels is presented whenever it is
necessary to determine whether one is confronting a form of price
fixing which will be held to be a per se violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.31 Ever since Socony-Vacuum,32 price fixing has been
a per se violation of Section 1, but the evidence sufficient to prove or
disprove the existence of price fixing has been controversial. This is
not surprising, since, given a homogeneous product and other con-
ditions of "perfect competition," prices would always be identical.
If no other facts were taken into account, no one could tell the dif-
ference between perfect conspiracy and perfect competition. Never-
theless, the courts tended to find that where prices were, in fact, the
same, a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act had occurred, and
no justification for such pricing was permissible.
This was the rule until 1978 when the Supreme Court held in
BM133 that blanket licensing of musical compositions, which re-
quired licensees to pay fees established by BMI, was not a form of
price fixing that was per se illegal. The Court held that although
BMI established licensing rates for a multiplicity of musical works
to be performed by many kinds of users, such arrangements were
necessary because there was no other efficient way that performers
could pay for the right to perform copyrighted music.34 The Court,
therefore, ruled that BMI's blanket licensing arrangements should
be judged under a rule of reason, rather than under a per se rule,35
and went on to hold that BMI's system was not anticompetitive
because licensees could, in theory, go back to individual authors,
composers, or publishers and negotiate specific licensing rates.
30. See, eg., Vertical Restraints Guidelines Resolution, H.R. Res. 303, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985), reprinted in 49 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 952 (1985) and the
accompanying report of the Committee on the Judiciary (Vertical Restraints Guidelines pub-
lished by the Department of Justice on January 23, 1985 do not have the force of law, do not
accurately state current antitrust law, and should not be considered by the courts of the
United States as binding or persuasive).
31. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (currently codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
32. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
33. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
34. Id. at 20-21.
35. Id. at 24.
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More fundamental, however, was the Court's holding that the BMI
blanket licenses increased the efficiency of the system under which
musical compositions are performed, while providing a relatively
simple method of collection and payment for a multiplicity of prov-
iders and performers.
Even though this decision appeared to open up price fixing cases
to rule of reason or lower-level language analysis, the rule of reason
appears to have been applied in a per se or higher-level way in such
later cases as Maricopa.6 In that case, a foundation set up by the
Maricopa County Medical Society to provide the Maricopa com-
munity with a competitive alternative to existing health insurance
plans was prohibited from contracting with member doctors to es-
tablish the maximum fees the doctors could claim in full payment
for health services provided under specified insurance plans.3 7 The
agreement did not escape condemnation under the per se rule
against price fixing, even though it fixed only maximum prices and
left member doctors free to compete by charging lower prices.
These examples, taken together, demonstrate that the Supreme
Court has tended to move from higher- to lower-level languages,
and then back again, in a pattern that suggests that the per se/rule
of reason spectrum approximates a sine curve. While the altitude of
the peaks and valleys of the curve, and the distances between them,
are not predictable, the Supreme Court appears to be trying to per-
mit neither plaintiffs nor defendants to use economic or legal labels
that carry immediate legal conclusions if the words and associated
concepts do not fit the specific facts. However, it is not always pos-
sible for an observer to tell the difference.
IV. ISSUES IN THE STRUCTURE OF LAW AND KNOWLEDGE
When we examine changes in the forms of competition, in the
concepts used to delineate the competitive process, and in the laws
designed to order competitive conduct, we find the fundamental co-
nundrums of Western thought continually reified in the shifting lan-
guage of antitrust. The age-old tensions between being and
knowledge appear, disappear, and reappear whenever we explore
the forms and outcomes of the "competition" paradigm as it shifts
its avatars38 in response to changing market facts and legal percep-
36. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
37. Id. at 336.
38. Avatar: The descent of a deity to the earth in an incarnate form; manifestation or
presentation to the world as a ruling power. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 150 (1971).
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tions. The shifting forms of the riddles of the one and the many and
of the relativity of size and time illustrate these tensions.
A. The One and the Many
Many antitrust problems can be solved only by determining
whether one is observing an integrated whole or a collection of indi-
viduals. This is, of course, the ancient problem of the one and the
many39 and is germane whenever the application of the law varies
with the perception of whether one is dealing with "one" or "more
than one" entity, whether a product, a service, or a company. Ty-
ing, intracorporate conspiracy, and third-party insurer problems all
present examples.
1. Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement requires a buyer who wants to purchase A
to also purchase B.4' Such a requirement has for many years been
illegal per se.4 1 No violation occurs, however, if there is, in fact,
only one item in what might appear to be a package of two or
more. Furthermore, even if two items are sold together by one sup-
plier, the Supreme Court held in Jefferson Parish42 that there is no
violation of law if the seller does not have market power since, in
that case, buyers have alternative sources for each product or ser-
vice. The majority opinion noted that every refusal to sell two
products or services separately does not restrain competition. If
39. The problem of the one and the many has confronted man in all areas of life. "Sci-
ence, philosophy, and religion alike have all been basically concerned with the resolution of
but one single problem: that of the relationship between multiplicity and unity." D. GRAY,
THE ONE AND THE MANY 156 (1969) (quoting philosopher Tielhard de Chardin). De Char-
din tried to reconcile the two extremes in such a way that the "multiple can be unified with-
out being destroyed." He believed that "[the whole purpose and meaning of the
evolutionary process is to achieve increasingly higher forms of union." Id. at 157.
40. For a discussion of tying arrangements, see Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying
Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69 MiNN. L. REv. 1013 (1985).
41. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (unreasonable
per se for defendant to require customers to use defendant's salt in defendant's salt ma-
chines); Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (illegal for defendant to sell
spare land with stipulation that all products made thereon be shipped on defendant's
railroad).
42. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984). The major-
ity implied that it would have found the tie of anesthesiological services to surgery at East
Jefferson Hospital illegal per se if the hospital either sold a unique product that competitors
were unable to offer or if the hospital's market share was high. But, it held that neither of
these conditions existed, since approximately 70% of the patients living in Jefferson Parish go
to hospitals other than East Jefferson and, with a 30% share of patients, East Jefferson's
market share represented an insufficient basis for inferring market power. Id. at 1555, 1568.
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each of the products can readily be purchased separately, an indi-
vidual seller's decision to sell the two in a single package does not
impose an unreasonable restraint on either the tying or the tied
market.43 By contrast, under an illegal tying arrangement, the
seller has the power to exploit its control over a tying product and
to force the buyer to purchase the tied product.
A related problem occurs when a plaintiff argues that a trade-
mark and the product or service it covers are two, rather than one,
entity and, therefore, is a tie that is illegal per se. In Jack Walters v.
Morton Building,' Jack Walters, a buildings material dealer, was
terminated by Morton Building, Inc., a manufacturer of prefabri-
cated buildings. Walters then sued Morton, alleging that Morton
had tied the sale of building components to the Morton trademark
and that later Morton had, as part of an advertising campaign for
its products, put a ceiling on the prices at which a dealer could
resell Morton materials.45 Walters nevertheless sold at prices above
Morton's ceiling price just before it was terminated. Walters ar-
gued, among other things, that Morton had tied the sale of its
materials to its trademark, and that this was a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. Judge Posner, who wrote the decision for the Sev-
enth Circuit, held that Morton's prefabricated farm buildings and
its trademark were not two separate products and, accordingly,
found that tying could not have occurred. Therefore, no per se vio-
lation of law was involved.46
2. Intracorporate Conspiracy
A conspiracy among independent competitors to fix prices, limit
output, or allocate markets has long been recognized as a per se
violation of law.47 Although the rule is clear, what constitutes evi-
dence of a conspiracy in the absence of written documents is not as
clear as the simplicity of the rule suggests. In fact, over the years,
43. Id. at 1558.
44. Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 432 (1984). In considering whether a trademark and the product it covers
can be viewed as one product or as a tie, Judge Posner noted that every product can be seen
as a package of its components: a pair of shoes, for example, or a belt (buckle and strap).
Indeed, much of what is called manufacturing is the assembly or physical integration of com-
ponents. "The problem is that there is no obvious way of deciding whether a product is a
single product or an assemblage of components." Id. at 703.
45. Id. at 706.
46. Id. at 703-06.
47. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), explicitly makes it illegal for
two or more parties to form a "contract, combination.., or conspiracy in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations."
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varying kinds of activity have been assimilated into the concept of
conspiracy whenever two or more actors were involved in an agree-
ment which destroyed independent decision-making by one or more
of them. However, there can be, by definition, no conspiracy when
only a single entity is involved. This theory has led plaintiffs who
wanted to charge conspiracy to try to demonstrate that an entity
which superficially might be considered "one" was really "more
than one."
Such arguments reached their apex in Timken Roller Bearing48
and Kiefer-Stewart49 in which the Supreme Court held that subsidi-
aries of a parent company could conspire with sister subsidiaries or
their parents. But, these theories were upset by the Supreme Court
late in 1984. In Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corporation,0
the issue was whether Copperweld and a subsidiary had conspired
against a terminated customer, or whether they were, in effect, one
company exercising normal business judgment. Facing this ques-
tion squarely, the Supreme Court held that a parent and a subsidi-
ary it controls are not two separate companies and therefore could
not conspire.5 '
3. Third-Party Insurer
A different form of the problem of the one and the many (or of
normal business judgment versus conspiracy) turns up in a number
of health insurance situations. In Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massa-
chusetts,52 for example, a group of doctors sued Blue Shield of Mas-
sachusetts. Blue Shield had been authorized by the state to prohibit
doctors who signed up with it from billing patients for sums beyond
those paid to the doctors by Blue Shield. Several Massachusetts
physicians challenged this ban on "balance billing" and alleged that
it was, in effect, a conspiracy between Blue Shield and other physi-
cian members of the Blue Shield group.53 Plaintiffs charged that
the conspiracy denied them the opportunity to use what they
thought were the most appropriate diagnostic or treatment proce-
dures if such methods were more expensive than the stipulated Blue
Shield prices. The doctors argued that the conspiracy defrauded
them of income and prevented them from using their best judgment
48. Timken Roler Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
49. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
50. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
51. Id. at 2742.
52. 749 F.2d 922 (lst Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 (1985).
53. Id. at 923.
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concerning the proper care of their patients.5 4 The First Circuit
deflated this argument, holding that Blue Shield pays for physician
care on behalf of their insured customers. In such circumstances,
there can be no conspiracy because there is only one buyer-Blue
Shield of Massachusetts. Blue Shield is not a "third force" inter-
vening in the marketplace and preventing willing buyers and sellers
from striking a bargain. Rather, Blue Shield itself is the purchaser
of the doctors' services."
B. The Relativity of Size and Time
Another major set of antitrust problems is related to perceptions
of size. Those concerned with ways to support and strengthen small
business have long acknowledged that a "small" business cannot be
easily defined. What is small for the steel or the oil industry is, of
course, large for garment manufacturing. Yet, it took far longer for
antitrust to acknowledge that we face the same problem with "big-
ness." With the continuing inflation of the 1960's and 1970's, what
was an unusually large business in the 1960's has become an aver-
age-size one today. "Size" is, therefore, not a thing in itself, but is
relative to markets and to their penetrability over time. 6
Still another range of antitrust problems is related to our percep-
tions of time, particularly to our perception of the short and the
long run. How we define a market share or entry into a market is
affected by the time frame employed. The shorter the time, the less
is the likelihood that new companies will enter a market or that
market shares will change substantially. The longer the time span,
the more probable is entry or exit and the more opportunity there is
for market boundaries to shift with a concomitant change in market
shares and concentration levels.57 One of the most significant
problems generated by the relativity of time frames is that of differ-
entiating between competitive and predatory pricing.
Competition and the laws affecting it attempt to provide con-
sumers with the best possible products at the lowest possible prices
54. Id. at 924.
55. Id. Judge Breyer analogized the situation to a father taking his son into a toy shop.
The boy selects the toy he wants, and the father pays for it. Which is the buyer? Surely not
the son; he merely selected the toy. The father bought and paid for it on behalf of the son and
would not allow the store owner to charge the son anything extra. Id. at 925.
56. See, eg., Farkas & Weinberger, The Relativity of Concentration Observations, CONF.
BOARD REP. No. 742 (1978).
57. An exception to this generalization occurs when a strong "monopolist" produces a
product of such excellence and with such low prices that buyers receive the benefits of compe-
tition without the fact of competition.
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while generating choices for buyers that permit them the greatest
possible leeway in selecting their preferred product/price combina-
tions." Predation, by contrast, is designed to drive out, and keep
out, competitors, leaving the predator in control of a market.5 9
Given this distinction between competition and predation, low
prices can result from either one, with the difference hinging on
how far and how long prices stay below the seller's costs. The
shorter the time, the lower are the costs to be taken into account;
the longer the time, the higher the costs to be accommodated.' A
supplier is, therefore, said to be engaged in predation if his prices
are so far below his costs for so long a period of time that he will
suffer serious losses that he can never recoup unless he can force his
competitors out of business and keep them out for long enough to
raise his prices and sell in sufficient volume to cover more than past
losses. While this is something that traditional populist economists
fear is a frequent occurrence, many modem economists feel that it
cannot occur for any protracted period of time, unless the govern-
ment prevents competitors from entering such a market.
The critical point for present purposes is that neither the short
nor the long run is a fixed time span, but rather is determined by
our perception of direct and fixed costs in specific markets. The
Areeda-Tumer model,61 and all other models designed to distin-
guish between predatory and competitive pricing, requires an un-
derstanding of this phenomenon. According to Areeda-Turner, a
price is predatory only if it lies below marginal cost: the cost of
58. It is, of course, possible to have too many alternatives, so that one cannot shop the
market, but that is another problem and beyond the scope of this Commentary.
59. See R. POSNER, ANTrrRusT 361 (1974).
60. This is so because although costs can be viewed in various ways, they are generally
seen as being made up of variable (or direct) and fixed (or overhead) costs. Variable or direct
costs are those incurred in order to make and sell additional units of a product or service. If
the product is not made, or the service not rendered, the cost is not incurred. A special type
of variable cost is marginal cost or the cost of the last unit of a product produced. See P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 452-55 (10th ed. 1976). Fixed or overhead costs are those incurred
over a longer time span: setting aside funds in anticipation of the purchase of an expensive
machine or for the building of a plant, expanding to increase a plant's capacity, paying the
salary of managers, or carrying on research and development work designed to keep a prod-
uct from becoming obsolete. Id. at 467. Such costs are incurred regardless of how many
units of the product/service are manufactured or sold.
Note, however, that although these definitions of cost appear to be relatively clear, they
are not. For what period of time must we observe a set of costs to call them overhead costs;
and for what period must we observe a production function to call the associated costs varia-
ble costs? In fact, in the very long run, all costs approach variable costs.
61. See P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXr, CAsES 194-96 (3d ed.
1981).
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producing one more increment of output. 62 However, since margi-
nal cost is difficult to isolate, variable cost, or the total non-fixed
cost divided by the total output, is used as a surrogate.63 The
Areeda-Turner rule states, therefore, that a price below average va-
riable cost is predatory."4 But, of course, what constitutes a varia-
ble cost depends on the time period considered.65
V. FINAL NOTE
Why antitrust can better be considered as a language reflecting
enterprise change rather than a law controlling such change is
bound up with the problems of verbal specification and generaliza-
tion concerning competition in the future tense. This Commentary
does not present a comprehensive theory of the reasons for this situ-
ation. However, three such reasons are the unmapped gaps between
on-going enterprise realities and what we know about them, the
pace of technological and rhetorical change, and the shifting duality
of meanings implicit in the central concepts of competition.
The language aspects of antitrust are central to today's contro-
versies concerning the legal aspects. The rhythm of executive ac-
tion, statutory amendment, court decisions, economic analysis, and
the trial process itself ensures continuing shifts in the language in
which we try to express how and why differing industry structures
and practices affect competition in differing time-and-place-frames.
Indeed, antitrust as a language-made up as it is of words and
concepts representing classifications of corporate behavior and com-
petitive consequences-presents a densely packed field of formula-
tions of the most fundamental metaphysical problems known to
Western thought: the ambiguity of a symbol and that to which it
refers, and the confusion between class and individual. These
problems are endemic to our forms of communication concerning
competition and the logic systems generated by this language. They
are the problems that appear whenever words do not refer to some-
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cf. F. FISHER, J. McGOWAN & J. GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTI-
LATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM (1983). The authors argue that a company,
be it small or large, one among many similar companies or a dominant company, should be
free to lower its prices or redesign its products and still be considered as engaged in competi-
tion rather than predation, so long as it is earning a profit. Pricing becomes predatory, they
contend, only when prices are fixed so low that the seller will steadily lose money and can
recoup only if he can be certain that in some later time period he can raise his prices without
fear of entry by competitors who would take his market away.
[Vol. 36:326
COMMENTARY
thing concrete, like "the wall," or "the boy running," or "the man,
woman, and child." When we talk about "competition" or "con-
centration" or "market power" or "predatory pricing," we are not
only considering classifications of activities and imputed conse-
quences, we are using concepts that contain their own opposites:
competition that destroys competition, concentration that promotes
entry and deconcentration, and market power, sometimes unfairly
achieved but often developed and supported by well-designed ven-
tures in new markets, steadfastness in declining markets, or simply
wisdom, efficiency, and responsiveness to buyers in normal markets.
The more fully such conceptual duality holds true for these and
other labels for varying forms of enterprise behavior, the greater
will be the uncertainty of those who enforce and those who must
operate businesses under the law. But, the more blind we are to
dualities and the more we seek to eliminate the ambiguities by creat-
ing simple rules, the less well will the rules fit the rich variety of
conduct to which they are applied.
The question arises whether similar examination of other laws
would lead us through the same mazes. The answer is . . . not
necessarily. While all law contains the problems inherent in the dif-
ference between words and events and between individuals and the
classes to which they can be assigned, other laws do not, as a rule,
focus on so ambiguous and multi-faceted a concept as competi-
tion-a process that continually destroys as it renews itself. For
this reason, chaos is never far from the edges of the laws on compe-
tition. We expect each competitor to outdo his competitors, but the
ultimate survival of such a rule in a changing world requires either
social toleration of serious business losses or an infinitely expanding
transactional universe.
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